

## Formal semantics

We now need to define how processes execute.

For example we would like

$$\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \mid \text{recv}_c(x); Q \xrightarrow{\tau} P \mid Q[M/x]$$

where  $\tau$  denotes a silent action (internal communication).

Let  $fn(M)$  and  $fn(P)$  be the set of free names in term  $M$  and process  $P$  respectively.

Let  $fv(M)$  and  $fv(P)$  be the set of free variables in term  $M$  and process  $P$  respectively.

Closed processes are processes without any free variables.

Let  $P \triangleq \text{new } c; \text{new } K; \text{recv}_d(x); \text{case } x \text{ of } \{y\}_{K'} : \text{send}_d(\{y\}_K, z, c); \text{halt}.$

We have

$$fn(\text{send}_d(\{y\}_K, z, c); \text{halt}) = \{c, d, K\}$$

$$fv(\text{send}_d(\{y\}_K, z, c); \text{halt}) = \{y, z\}$$

$$fn(\text{case } x \text{ of } \{y\}_{K'} : \text{send}_d(\{y\}_K, z, c); \text{halt}) = \{c, d, K, K'\}$$

$$fv(\text{case } x \text{ of } \{y\}_{K'} : \text{send}_d(\{y\}_K, z, c); \text{halt}) = \{x, z\}$$

$$fn(P) = \{d, K'\}$$

$$fv(P) = \{z\}$$

$$fn(\{y\}_K) = \{K\}$$

$$fv(\{y\}_K) = \{y\}$$

First we define reduction relation  $>$  on closed processes:

$$\begin{aligned} & \text{repeat } P > P \mid \text{repeat } P \\ & \text{check } (M == M); P > P \\ & \text{let } (x, y) = (M, N); P > P[M/x, N/y] \\ & \text{case } 0 \text{ of } 0 : P, \text{succ } (x) : Q > P \\ & \text{case succ } (M) \text{ of } 0 : P, \text{succ } (x) : Q > Q[M/x] \\ & \text{case } \{M\}_N \text{ of } \{x\}_N : P > P[M/x] \end{aligned}$$

When these rules cannot be applied, it means that the process cannot be simplified.

The following processes cannot be simplified, hence cannot be executed further.

$\text{check } (0 == \text{succ } (0)); P$  (comparison fails).

$\text{let } (x, y) = 0; P$  (unpairing fails)

$\text{case } (M, N) \text{ of } 0 : P, \text{succ } (x) : Q$  (not an integer)

$\text{case } (M, N) \text{ of } \{x, y\}_K : P$  (not an encrypted message)

$\text{case } \{M, N\}_{K'} \text{ of } \{x, y\}_K : P$  where  $K \neq K'$

When these rules cannot be applied, it means that the process cannot be simplified.

The following processes cannot be simplified, hence cannot be executed further.

$\text{check } (0 == \text{succ } (0)); P$  (comparison fails).

$\text{let } (x, y) = 0; P$  (unpairing fails)

$\text{case } (M, N) \text{ of } 0 : P, \text{succ } (x) : Q$  (not an integer)

$\text{case } (M, N) \text{ of } \{x, y\}_K : P$  (not an encrypted message)

$\text{case } \{M, N\}_{K'} \text{ of } \{x, y\}_K : P$  where  $K \neq K'$

This is also based on the [perfect cryptography](#) assumption: distinct terms represent distinct messages.

A barb  $\beta$  is either

- a name  $n$  (representing input on channel  $n$ ), or
- a co-name  $\bar{n}$  (representing output on channel  $n$ )

An action is either

- a barb (representing input or output to the outside world), or
- $\tau$  (representing a silent action i.e. internal communication)

We write  $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} Q$  to mean that  $P$  makes action  $\alpha$  after which  $Q$  is the remaining process that is left to be executed.

Commitment relation Consider again  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \mid \text{recv}_c(x); Q$

**Commitment relation** Consider again  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \mid \text{recv}_c(x); Q$

The first subprocess makes an output action on channel  $c$ .

We will represent it as  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle M \rangle P$ .

$\langle M \rangle P$  is called a **concretion**: it represents a commitment to output message  $M$  after which  $P$  will be executed.



**Commitment relation** Consider again  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \mid \text{recv}_c(x); Q$

The first subprocess makes an output action on channel  $c$ .

We will represent it as  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle M \rangle P$ .

$\langle M \rangle P$  is called a **concretion**: it represents a commitment to output message  $M$  after which  $P$  will be executed.

The second subprocess makes an input action on channel  $c$ .

We will represent it as  $\text{recv}_c(x); Q \xrightarrow{c} (x)Q$ .

$(x)Q$  is called an **abstraction**: it represents a commitment to input some  $x$  after which  $Q$  will be executed.

**Commitment relation** Consider again  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \mid \text{recv}_c(x); Q$

The first subprocess makes an output action on channel  $c$ .

We will represent it as  $\text{send}_c\langle M \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle M \rangle P$ .

$\langle M \rangle P$  is called a **concretion**: it represents a commitment to output message  $M$  after which  $P$  will be executed.

The second subprocess makes an input action on channel  $c$ .

We will represent it as  $\text{recv}_c(x); Q \xrightarrow{c} (x)Q$ .

$(x)Q$  is called an **abstraction**: it represents a commitment to input some  $x$  after which  $Q$  will be executed.

Abstractions and concretions can be combined:

$$\langle M \rangle P @ (x)Q = P \mid Q[M/x]$$

Formally an **abstraction**  $F$  is of the form

$$(x_1, \dots, x_k)P$$

where  $k \geq 0$  and  $P$  is a process.

A **concretion**  $C$  is of the form

$$(\text{new } n_1, \dots, n_l) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P$$

where  $n_1, \dots, n_l$  are names,  $l, k \geq 0$  and  $P$  is a process.

Formally an **abstraction**  $F$  is of the form

$$(x_1, \dots, x_k)P$$

where  $k \geq 0$  and  $P$  is a process.

A **concretion**  $C$  is of the form

$$(\text{new } n_1, \dots, n_l)\langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P$$

where  $n_1, \dots, n_l$  are names,  $l, k \geq 0$  and  $P$  is a process.

For  $F \triangleq (x_1, \dots, x_k)P$  and  $C \triangleq (\text{new } n_1, \dots, n_l)\langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle Q$

with  $\{n_1, \dots, n_l\} \cap \text{fn}(P) = \emptyset$  we define interaction of  $F$  and  $C$  as

$$F @ C \triangleq \text{new } n_1; \dots \text{new } n_l; (P[M_1/x_1, \dots, M_k/x_k] \mid Q)$$

$$C @ F \triangleq \text{new } n_1; \dots \text{new } n_l; (Q \mid P[M_1/x_1, \dots, M_k/x_k])$$

An **agent**  $A$  is an abstraction, concretion or a process.

We write the commitment relation as  $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A$  where  $P$  is a closed process,  $A$  is a closed agent ( $fv(A) = \emptyset$ ) and  $\alpha$  is an action.

An agent  $A$  is an abstraction, concretion or a process.

We write the commitment relation as  $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A$  where  $P$  is a closed process,  $A$  is a closed agent ( $fv(A) = \emptyset$ ) and  $\alpha$  is an action.

$$\text{send}_m \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} (\text{new } ) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P$$

An agent  $A$  is an abstraction, concretion or a process.

We write the commitment relation as  $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A$  where  $P$  is a closed process,  $A$  is a closed agent ( $fv(A) = \emptyset$ ) and  $\alpha$  is an action.

$$\text{send}_m \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} (\text{new } ) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P$$

$$\text{recv}_m (x_1, \dots, x_k); P \xrightarrow{m} (x_1, \dots, x_k) P$$

An agent  $A$  is an abstraction, concretion or a process.

We write the commitment relation as  $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A$  where  $P$  is a closed process,  $A$  is a closed agent ( $fv(A) = \emptyset$ ) and  $\alpha$  is an action.

$$\text{send}_m \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} (\text{new } ) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P$$

$$\text{recv}_m(x_1, \dots, x_k); P \xrightarrow{m} (x_1, \dots, x_k) P$$

$$\frac{P \xrightarrow{m} F \quad Q \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} C}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\tau} F @ C}$$



An **agent**  $A$  is an abstraction, concretion or a process.

We write the commitment relation as  $P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A$  where  $P$  is a closed process,  $A$  is a closed agent ( $fv(A) = \emptyset$ ) and  $\alpha$  is an action.

$$\text{send}_m \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle; P \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} (\text{new } ) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P$$

$$\text{recv}_m(x_1, \dots, x_k); P \xrightarrow{m} (x_1, \dots, x_k) P$$

$$\frac{P \xrightarrow{m} F \quad Q \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} C}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\tau} F @ C}$$

$$\frac{P \xrightarrow{\bar{m}} C \quad Q \xrightarrow{m} F}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\tau} C @ F}$$

## Example

Define

$$P \triangleq \text{send}_c \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle; \text{halt}$$
$$Q \triangleq \text{recv}_c(x); \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

From our rules we have

## Example

Define

$$P \triangleq \text{send}_c \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle; \text{halt}$$
$$Q \triangleq \text{recv}_c(x); \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

From our rules we have

$$P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle \text{halt}$$

( $\langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$  denotes  $(\text{new } ) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$ )

## Example

Define

$$P \triangleq \text{send}_c \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle; \text{halt}$$
$$Q \triangleq \text{recv}_c(x); \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

From our rules we have

$$P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle \text{halt}$$

( $\langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$  denotes  $(\text{new}) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$ )

$$Q \xrightarrow{c} (x) \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

## Example

Define

$$P \triangleq \text{send}_c \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle; \text{halt}$$

$$Q \triangleq \text{recv}_c(x); \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

From our rules we have

$$P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle \text{halt}$$

( $\langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$  denotes  $(\text{new}) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$ )

$$Q \xrightarrow{c} (x) \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

$$P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\tau} \text{halt} \mid \text{case succ } (0) \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

## Example

Define

$$P \triangleq \text{send}_c \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle; \text{halt}$$

$$Q \triangleq \text{recv}_c(x); \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

From our rules we have

$$P \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle \text{succ } (0) \rangle \text{halt}$$

( $\langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$  denotes  $(\text{new}) \langle M_1, \dots, M_k \rangle P'$ )

$$Q \xrightarrow{c} (x) \text{case } x \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

$$P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\tau} \text{halt} \mid \text{case succ } (0) \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt})$$

$$\xrightarrow{\bar{d}} \langle 0 \rangle (\text{halt} \mid \text{halt}) \quad \text{using the following rules...}$$

$$\frac{P > Q \quad Q \xrightarrow{\alpha} A}{P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A}$$

$$\frac{P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\alpha} A \mid Q} \quad \frac{Q \xrightarrow{\alpha} A}{P \mid Q \xrightarrow{\alpha} P \mid A}$$

where

$$P_1 \mid (x_1, \dots, x_k) P_2 \triangleq (x_1, \dots, x_k) (P_1 \mid P_2)$$

$$P_1 \mid (\text{new } n_1, \dots, n_k) \langle M_1, \dots, M_l \rangle P_2 \triangleq (\text{new } n_1, \dots, n_k) \langle M_1, \dots, M_l \rangle (P_1 \mid P_2)$$

provided that  $x_1, \dots, x_k \notin fv(P_1)$  and  $n_1, \dots, n_k \notin fn(P_1)$

For the previous example we have:

$$\text{case succ } (0) \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{ succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt}) > \text{send}_d \langle 0 \rangle; \text{halt}$$

and

$$\text{send}_d \langle 0 \rangle; \text{halt} \xrightarrow{\bar{d}} \langle 0 \rangle \text{halt}$$

hence

$$\text{case succ } (0) \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{ succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt}) \xrightarrow{\bar{d}} \langle 0 \rangle \text{halt}$$

hence

$$\begin{aligned} \text{halt} \mid \text{case succ } (0) \text{ of } 0 : \text{halt}, \text{ succ } (y) : (\text{send}_d \langle y \rangle; \text{halt}) &\xrightarrow{\bar{d}} \text{halt} \mid \langle 0 \rangle \text{halt} \\ &= \langle 0 \rangle (\text{halt} \mid \text{halt}) \end{aligned}$$



Consider  $P \triangleq (\text{recv}_c(x); P_1) \mid \text{new } c; (\text{send}_c\langle 0 \rangle; P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3)$

We would like  $P \xrightarrow{\tau} (\text{recv}_c(x); P_1) \mid \text{new } c; (P_2 \mid P_3[0/x])$

but not  $P \xrightarrow{\tau} P_1[0/x] \mid \text{new } n; (P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3)$

Consider  $P \triangleq (\text{recv}_c(x); P_1) \mid \text{new } c; (\text{send}_c\langle 0 \rangle; P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3)$

We would like  $P \xrightarrow{\tau} (\text{recv}_c(x); P_1) \mid \text{new } c; (P_2 \mid P_3[0/x])$

but not  $P \xrightarrow{\tau} P_1[0/x] \mid \text{new } n; (P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3)$

Hence we have the rule

$$\boxed{\frac{P \xrightarrow{\alpha} A \quad \alpha \notin \{n, \bar{n}\}}{\text{new } n; P \xrightarrow{\alpha} \text{new } n; A}}$$

where

$$(\text{new } m)(x_1, \dots, x_k)P \triangleq (x_1, \dots, x_k)\text{new } m; P$$

$$(\text{new } m)(\text{new } m_1, \dots, m_k)\langle M_1, \dots, M_l \rangle P \triangleq (\text{new } m, m_1, \dots, m_k)\langle M_1, \dots, M_l \rangle P$$

provided that  $m \notin \{m_1, \dots, m_k\}$

We have  $\text{send}_c\langle 0 \rangle; P_2 \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \langle 0 \rangle P_2$

and  $\text{recv}_c(x); P_3 \xrightarrow{c} (x)P_3$

hence  $\text{send}_c\langle 0 \rangle; P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3 \xrightarrow{\tau} \langle 0 \rangle P_2 @ (x)P_3 = P_2 \mid P_3[0/x]$

Since  $\tau \notin \{\bar{c}, c\}$

hence  $\text{new } c; (\text{send}_c\langle 0 \rangle; P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3) \xrightarrow{\tau} \text{new } c; (P_2 \mid P_3[0/x])$

Hence  $(\text{recv}_c(x); P_1) \mid \text{new } c; (\text{send}_c\langle 0 \rangle; P_2 \mid \text{recv}_c(x); P_3) \xrightarrow{\tau} (\text{recv}_c(x); P_1) \mid \text{new } c; (P_2 \mid P_3[0/x])$

Consider  $P \triangleq (\text{new } K; \text{send}_c \langle K \rangle; \text{halt}) \mid (\text{recv}_c(x); \text{send}_d \langle x \rangle; \text{halt})$

We have  $\text{send}_c \langle K \rangle; \text{halt} \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} (\text{new } ) \langle K \rangle \text{halt}$

hence  $\text{new } K; \text{send}_c \langle K \rangle; \text{halt} \xrightarrow{\bar{c}} \text{new } K; (\text{new } ) \langle K \rangle \text{halt} = (\text{new } K) \langle K \rangle \text{halt}$

Also  $\text{recv}_c(x); \text{send}_d \langle x \rangle; \text{halt} \xrightarrow{c} (x) \text{send}_d \langle x \rangle; \text{halt}$

Hence

$P \xrightarrow{\tau} (\text{new } K) \langle K \rangle \text{halt} @ (x) \text{send}_d \langle x \rangle; \text{halt} = (\text{new } K)(\text{halt} \mid \text{send}_d \langle K \rangle; \text{halt})$

## Equivalence on processes

A **test** is of the form  $(Q, \beta)$  where  $Q$  is a closed process and  $\beta$  is a barb.

A process  $P$  **passes** the test  $(Q, \beta)$  iff

$$(P \mid Q) \xrightarrow{\tau} Q_1 \dots \xrightarrow{\tau} Q_n \xrightarrow{\beta} A$$

for some  $n \geq 0$ , some processes  $Q_1, \dots, Q_n$  and some agent  $A$ .

$Q$  is the "environment" and we test whether the process together with the environment inputs or outputs on a particular channel.

**Testing preorder**  $P_1 \sqsubseteq P_2$  iff for every test  $(Q, \beta)$ , if  $P_1$  passes  $(Q, \beta)$  then  $P_2$  passes  $(Q, \beta)$ .

**Testing equivalence**  $P_1 \simeq P_2$  iff  $P_1 \sqsubseteq P_2$  and  $P_2 \sqsubseteq P_1$ .

## Secrecy

Consider process  $P$  with only free variable  $x$ .

We will consider  $x$  as secret if for all terms  $M, M'$  we have  $P[M/x] \simeq P[M'/x]$ .

I.e. an observer cannot detect any changes in the value of  $x$ .

**Example** Consider  $P \triangleq \text{send}_c\langle x \rangle; \text{halt}$ .

$x$  is being sent out on a public channel. Consider test  $(Q, \bar{d})$  where

environment  $Q \triangleq \text{recv}_c(x); \text{check } (x == 0); \text{send}_d\langle 0 \rangle; \text{halt}$ .

We have  $P[0/x] \mid Q \xrightarrow{\tau} \text{halt} \mid \text{send}_d\langle 0 \rangle; \text{halt} \xrightarrow{\bar{d}} \langle 0 \rangle(\text{halt} \mid \text{halt})$ .

Hence  $P[0/x]$  passes the test. However  $P[\text{succ } (0)/x]$  fails the test.

Hence  $P$  does not preserve secrecy of  $x$ .